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*2 I. Introduction
Legal education excels in honing students' critical thinking skills. At its best, it teaches students to slow down their
thinking and cultivate skepticism of their intuitive reactions.1 It does not shy away from making thinking difficult,
whether through assigning 1L students complicated texts or engaging them in difficult classroom discussions. It
teaches students to use abstract reasoning while simultaneously attending to specific, concrete facts.
At the same time, however, legal education privileges students who are faster readers and have prior background
knowledge or larger *3 working memories.2 Legal education prides itself on the accomplishments of students whose
backgrounds primed them for success while minimizing its inconsistent results in teaching law to students who are
not similarly prepared.3
Recognizing that legal reasoning does not come easily for many students, almost every law school offers some level
of academic support to students.4 In the decade and a half since the Carnegie Report,5 law schools and the American
Bar Association have focused their *4 attention on formative versus summative assessments,6 measurable outcomes
and objectives,7 and have begun discussing and incorporating principles of cognitive psychology and learning
theory into legal pedagogy.8 Legal pedagogy has become increasingly intentional and inclusive.9
Nonetheless, the academy uniformly recoils at the notion of “spoon-feeding” students.10 While effective teaching
can manifest in numerous ways, referring to a teaching technique as “spoon-feeding” is to dismiss it out of hand.11
According to the academy's prevailing mythology, the ultimate reward of being able to think like a lawyer is
obtained only via a painful pedagogical route.12 A student's journey begins with fog, is attended by constant
confusion, and ends with *5 eventual understanding. Rather than explicitly teaching students foundational rules and
concepts, professors use indirect methods, or implicit instruction, to guide students toward moments when the
student suddenly sees the underlying structure of the law, and everything begins to make sense. The assumption is
that to do otherwise will defeat students' learning by instilling passivity.13 They will learn to think like lawyers only
if they grapple with unfamiliar concepts and vocabulary until they eventually--somehow--reach illumination.
This theory of how students learn is not unique to the law.14 Known variously as “inquiry learning” or “discovery
learning,” implicit instruction is a constructivist theory rooted in 19th century ideals.15 According to this theory, if
students are immersed in an expert problem and allowed to struggle, they will eventually discern the underlying
principles, make sense of the chaos, and learn.16 Moreover, *6 because they struggled, their learning will be deeper
and perhaps even more creative.17
Over the past several decades, however, cognitive psychology and learning research have consistently shown this
not to be true. Inquiry learning can be “a clunky and confusing way of learning the basic content of a discipline.”18
Some amount of explicit instruction, especially early in the student's learning, ensures that students build their
understanding on a foundation of accurate knowledge.19 In other words, explicit instruction paves the way for
profound learning in the 1L year.20
Explicit instruction is a scaffolded process of instruction designed to gradually transfer control of the subject matter
from the professor to the students.21 Explicit instruction in the early stages of *7 learning promotes accurate,
thorough understanding of foundational knowledge.22 When students have a solid foundation of knowledge, they
are ready to engage in higher-order thinking.23 In other words, explicit instruction prepares students for more
complex thinking.
A professor using explicit instruction may provide students with substantive or procedural knowledge to accomplish
the task assigned to them. If implicit instruction is designed to give students immediate control of their learning,
with teachers giving only subtle suggestions and encouragement,24 explicit instruction is designed with the teacher
initially in control of the subject matter, gradually ceding control to the students.25 While implicit instruction
2
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encourages students to explore a subject, often with minimal bounds, explicit instruction is more structured,
channeling students down a particular path toward a specific learning goal.26 The more knowledgeable a learner,
the more useful *8 implicit instruction is.27 For brand-new learners, initial explicit instruction provides students
with substantive and procedural knowledge, thereby freeing up space in their working memories to devote to
thinking.28
Explicit instruction has many possible uses throughout the law school curriculum. A doctrinal professor may use
explicit methods of instruction to ensure that everyone in the class has sufficient foundational knowledge, as may a
professor teaching a course in practical lawyering skills, or an academic support instructor helping students fill in
gaps in their knowledge.
Unfortunately, the deep hostility baked into the phrase “spoon-feeding” coupled with the lack of pedagogical
standards addressing explicit instruction can lead conscientious professors to either shun explicit instruction or to
use it and feel ashamed.29 If the academy is to continue incorporating learning theory into its pedagogy, it must be
able to articulate the differences between spoon-feeding and explicit instruction so that professors can thoughtfully
choose when to use the latter, comfortable in knowing it is not the former.
Cognitive psychology research supports initial explicit instruction in new domains--even in law. Novice learners
use their existing schema to make sense of what happens in the classroom. To the extent *9 law schools expect
students' background knowledge and skills to buoy them through their first year of law school, they are allowing
students' privilege to leverage them into higher grades and more prestigious jobs.
This Article examines explicit instruction--what it is, whether it promotes learning, and whether it is a desirable
pedagogical tool in a law professor's toolbox. Part II begins by examining cognitive psychological theories of how
students think and learn to better articulate the differences between spoon-feeding and explicit instruction and
understand when and why explicit instruction is useful. Part III examines the cognitive differences between novices
and experts that support initial explicit instruction. Part IV examines experts' cognitive barriers to effective teaching.
Part V provides practical examples of how professors can use explicit instruction in the law school classroom. It
concludes that the time is ripe for the academy to bring explicit instruction out of the shadows, and to make
evidence-based decisions about the proper role of explicit instruction in legal education.
II. Implicit Instruction, Explicit Instruction, and Spoonfeeding
The goal of teaching is durable and flexible learning.30 The specific goal of legal education is to teach students to
think like lawyers.31 Although many debate what it means to think like a lawyer, cognitive psychology views critical
thinking of any sort as domain-specific.32 Lawyers think like lawyers, chess players think like chess players, and
plumbers think like plumbers. Domain-specific knowledge combined *10 with skill in using that knowledge makes
one an expert.33 If this were written as a formula, it might look like this:
Knowledge + Thinking = Expertise
Learning to reason is taxonomically distinct from acquiring knowledge.34 Legal educators correctly resist using
explicit instruction to teach students higher order thinking skills but incorrectly use implicit instruction to help
students acquire basic knowledge of the law that they need if they are to think like lawyers. Moreover, initial explicit
instruction can level the playing field among students who otherwise have significant differences in prior
background knowledge, reading ability, and working memories.
A. Thinking About Knowledge
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“Thinking” is a complex process, famously deconstructed and categorized by Bloom's Taxonomy.35 Knowledge
forms the base upon which more advanced thinking is built.36 To solve a scientific problem, one must have some
relevant scientific knowledge.37 Similarly, to solve a legal problem, one must have some relevant legal knowledge.
Students are novice learners lacking cognitive schema for understanding the law, and in many instances, lacking
cognitive schema for critical thinking and complex reading.
A primary cultural norm of legal education is that students learn to reason like lawyers by actively engaging with
complex texts (reading cases for class) and with their professors (Socratic dialogue).38 This is quintessential implicit
instruction--rather than convey knowledge and *11 reasoning directly, legal education immerses students in
appellate opinions and uses questions to guide them toward discerning both the underlying principles and rules of
law as well as the process of legal reasoning.
Notably, learning to reason is taxonomically distinct from acquiring knowledge.39 Using the same pedagogical
techniques for both fails to recognize this distinction. Moreover, learning theory suggests that initial explicit
instruction can level the playing field among students who otherwise have significant differences in prior
background knowledge, reading ability, and working memories.
There are a few places in law school where explicit instruction is commonplace: academic support, bar exam
preparation, and to a lesser extent, legal writing and research classes. As one bar prep student was heard saying, “‘I
wish that my professor had just done this in my 1L year. That class would have made so much more sense.”’40 This
is a common complaint among law students: Why do professors insist on hiding the ball?41 Professors respond with
sincere confusion, saying, “I don't know how I could have made it any clearer.” Their unspoken thought may be,
“had I made it any clearer, I would have been simply giving them the answer.” In other words, professors may “hide
the ball” to avoid spoon-feeding.
B. Law Is Biologically Secondary Knowledge
Cognitive psychologists categorize human knowledge as being either biologically primary or biologically
secondary.42 Examples of *12 biologically primary knowledge include acquiring one's first language, recognizing
faces, using general problem-solving strategies, and learning how to interact with other human beings.43 Because
humans have evolved to require biologically primary knowledge, they do not need explicit instruction to acquire
it.44 In fact, humans generally acquire biological knowledge when they are very young and are unaware of their
learning.45
Conversely, biologically secondary knowledge is required for cultural reasons rather than biological reasons.46
Examples include reading and writing. “[W]hile we require many aspects of biologically primary knowledge in
order to learn to write, learning to write is a vastly different skill than learning to speak.”47 Without explicit
instruction, further, humans do not naturally acquire biologically secondary knowledge,48 and schools exist to teach
such knowledge.49
Moreover, “the cognitive system used to learn to speak is different from the system used to learn to write.”50
Whereas learning biologically primary knowledge is unconscious and effortless, learning biologically secondary
knowledge requires conscious effort.51 For this reason, immersion is insufficient to teach a biologically secondary
skill.52
*13 Domain-specific cognitive skills such as legal analysis are biologically secondary. Problem-solving techniques
such as a means-ends analysis appear to be biologically primary.53 Problem-solving techniques that require domainspecific knowledge are biologically secondary.54
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While legal reasoning is not biologically primary, students come to law school with general problem-solving skills
that are biologically primary. These biologically primary skills are ones that they learned effortlessly when they
were young. Students use those skills unconsciously, without choosing to do so. When we teach students to reason
methodically and transparently, we are asking them to not only learn a new skill, but to identify and override their
existing unconscious skills. We are asking them to exert significant effort.
C. What Is “Spoon-Feeding”?
Spoon-feeding refers generally to giving someone so much information that they do not have to think for
themselves.55 In education, it refers to teacher-centered classrooms where students are given the answers and
expected merely to passively memorize and regurgitate them.56 For some in the academy, spoon-feeding refers
specifically to *14 the pedagogy that preceded the case method in Langdellian times, when professors would lecture
and students would merely listen.57 The risk of “spoon-feeding” students is that it may undermine their ability to
actively think about the topic, which is antithetical to legal reasoning.58
To the extent “spoon-feeding” refers to pedagogical practices that encourage passive learning, it is rightfully
derided.59 Law students must learn to logically reason their way through legal problems.60 The question for educators
is how to identify when they are spoon-feeding and when they are providing useful explicit instruction.
Importantly, professors' dismissal of certain pedagogical techniques as “spoon-feeding” may reflect more than their
mere desire to encourage skilled legal thinking. For example, a professor may believe that law students should not
have anything handed to them and that they should struggle if they are to earn the ultimate reward of being *15
lawyers.61 They may believe that law students must pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and conclude that
teaching students the skills they need to be competent law students and lawyers is spoon-feeding.62 Related to this
is the idea that lawyers must work hard and that law students should be introduced to those struggles early on.63
To a certain extent, the academy's dismissiveness of spoon-feeding may be an artifact of the traditional theory-skills
divide.64 According to this view, law schools must be more than mere trade schools,65 and professors must teach
students to be professionals, not mere technicians.66 At its most extreme, this view holds that independent thought
is the hallmark of a professional, and anytime a professor makes something explicit, he is robbing students of
independent *16 thought. Finally, some resist any explicit instruction as spoon-feeding because they believe the
law to be inherently unknowable.67
D. Is Our Fear of Spoon-Feeding Warranted?
The specter of spoon-feeding casts a shadow over those who opt for more explicit instruction in their classrooms.
While the academy knows how frustrated 1Ls get as they struggle to make sense of the myriad new concepts and
vocabulary thrown at them in their first semester, the collective belief reflected in our cultural mythology is that the
ultimate reward of being able to think like a lawyer cannot be obtained any other way. As Professor McClurg
explains, “we genuinely believe that the combination of the Socratic and case methods is the most effective way to
train new law students to develop the critical-thinking skills they will need as lawyers.”68 In this regard, we are not
unlike parents who believe that the pain of a spanking is for the child's own good, justified by the important lesson
conveyed by the punishment.
Importantly, many students do experience a “light-bulb” moment at some point in their 1L years. It is a magical
moment, indeed. As described by Professor McClurg, “[e]ven the Socratic-haters would be hard-pressed to deny
that they really did arrive at law school with ‘skulls full of mush,’ yet exited the Socratic arena as facile thinkers
and astute legal problem-solvers.”69
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This is an alluring promise--that a law student will enter law school with a mushy brain and exit with a facile mind.
Those of us in the academy find the promise mostly rings true. Many of us personally experienced that kind of
transformation in law school and continue to witness it with some of our students.
*17 It is equally undeniable, however, that not everyone ends their 1L year as “facile thinkers and astute legal
problem-solvers.”70 Many students never have a light-bulb moment. They struggle throughout law school,
understanding just enough to pass their exams and avoid academic probation or exclusion, but never really
understanding the big picture and perhaps not understanding enough to pass a bar exam.
E. Desirable Difficulties
Legal educators' revulsion of spoon-feeding reflects a belief that learning difficult material is necessarily difficult.
Many teaching techniques associated with law school are designed to prompt students to practice and develop their
higher order thinking skills by challenging them and making them uncomfortable.71 In other words, our pedagogical
goal is not to make things easy for our students. Instead, it is to teach students in a way that recognizes the cognitive
characteristics of novices and uses teaching methods that maximize students' learning.
Cognitive psychology supports the academy's collective belief that a certain amount of struggle is necessary to
achieve stable learning. Labeled “desirable difficulties,” they range from random variations in the conditions of
performance to “interleaving” materials so that students never feel fully at ease.72 A certain amount of cognitive
strain, therefore, enhances learning.73
Law professors tend to think of desirable difficulties as wrestling with complex concepts until that moment when
the light bulb turns on and everything begins to make sense. What they fail to recognize is the cognitive strain a
novice experiences in simply trying to understand basic concepts in a new domain. Cognitive strain arises from
challenges that force us to exert mental effort. For example, humans are hard-wired to make immediate assessments
about human facial *18 expressions, the distance between two points, or the sum of 2+2.74 In other words, humans
make those assessments automatically, without thinking about them.
Effortful thought is required for humans to solve complex problems such as 17 x24, or whether a contract satisfies
the statute of frauds.75 For novices who are learning basic concepts and vocabulary in a new domain, such as firstyear law students, effortful attention is required simply to follow the discussion in class. Solving complex problems
requires significant cognitive effort.76 In this way, because complex thinking requires attention and effort, it creates
“cognitive strain.”77 Familiarity, on the other hand, induces “cognitive ease,” which can lead to a heavier reliance
on automatic thinking as opposed to effortful thinking.78
Some student struggle is not only to be expected, but it is also necessary and should be lauded.79 But many student
struggles are not desirable; they are discouraging and dispiriting.80 In spite of investing significant time and effort,
students spin their wheels, going nowhere.81 *19 Rather than master their own thought processes, students spiral
into deepening confusion and decreasing self-esteem. Their struggles do not inspire, they do not lead to long-term
learning, and they offer no intrinsic reward.82
F. Thinking About Thinking: Bloom's Taxonomy
In the 1950s, a committee of the American Psychological Association chaired by Benjamin Bloom, an educational
psychologist from the University of Chicago, published a framework for thinking about learning.83 The goal was to
assist teachers in creating useful and attainable learning objectives in their classrooms.84 Known as Bloom's
Taxonomy, it posits a hierarchical framework for thinking and learning, and consequently for teaching.85
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According to Bloom's Taxonomy, human thought progresses in complexity. When we learn something new, we first
gain knowledge and remember it. As we comprehend it, we can begin to apply it, then *20 analyze it, then synthesize
it, and finally evaluate it.86 The higher-order skills of analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating are the skills we seek
to teach our students.87 However, in our quest to instill expert thinking skills in our students, we often overlook the
fundamental building blocks of thinking. From the first day of law school, we assign students complex appellate
decisions that present unfamiliar words, phrases, syntax, context, and doctrine. We further immerse them in
classroom discussions that range taxonomically from comprehension (Level Two) to synthesis and evaluation
(Levels Five and Six). While immersion is an effective way to teach a second language, students in immersion
classrooms often have gaps in their language skills unless they are given supplemental instruction in vocabulary
and grammar.88 To the extent legal education is akin to learning a second language,89 and to the extent legal
education relies on implicit instruction, we too may be unintentionally creating gaps in our students' learning that
explicit instruction could fill.
Bloom's provides categorical ways to distinguish detrimental spoon-feeding from useful explicit instruction. It first
illustrates that knowledge is fundamental to thinking. Without knowledge, students have nothing to comprehend,
analyze, synthesize, or evaluate.90 The idea that knowledge is a necessary precondition for thinking highlights the
importance of ensuring that students know, remember, and *21 understand the law we are asking them to apply.
Traditional legal education assumes that immersing students in high-level thinking will force them to acquire the
knowledge they need to engage in such thinking. Bloom's helps to explain why this assumption may be incorrect,
at least in the early stages of learning.
Thinking progresses from knowing and remembering to comprehending before moving to application, synthesis,
and evaluation.91 Without stable knowledge, memory, and comprehension of substantive material, students may
flail when asked to apply it. We conclude that they are not learning to think like lawyers when in fact they may
simply not have achieved sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the foundational law.92
In the language of Bloom's, the goal of legal education is to help students master higher order thinking within the
domain of the law.93 The initial stages of students' journeys involve learning both the substantive law as well as the
process of applying the law to facts. Over time, as students become experts, the substantive knowledge of the law
becomes grist for their mental mills, and the process of reasoning eclipses the acquisition of knowledge. But early
in their careers, learning the law--what it is, where to find it, how to know which law applies, and how to cite it--is
as challenging as learning to apply the law. More *22 importantly, knowing some law is a necessary prerequisite to
thinking about it.
Legal educators tend to conflate learning the law with learning to apply the law. Whether a 1L class is a doctrinal
or skills class, assessments generally focus on students' ability to use legal reasoning. In other words, students must
engage in higher-order thinking by applying law to facts. Rarely do law-school assessments test knowledge, the
first level of Bloom's Taxonomy. Instead, they test the third, fourth, and fifth levels. Nonetheless, a student who has
poor knowledge and comprehension will struggle with analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.
Because some students do very well in law school, it is tempting to assume that something is wrong with those who
do not. From a cognitive psychology perspective, though, the students who do well are likely starting off with one
or more advantages. They may have prior background knowledge, larger working memories, and faster reading
ability.
G. We're Not the Only Ones: The Reading Wars
Legal education is not alone in basking in the reflected glory of students who learn easily while simultaneously
throwing its hands up in exasperation with those who do not. Educators and researchers in other disciplines have
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thought a lot about this very conundrum. The dialogue in reading instruction is particularly robust, with similar
discussions occurring in math and science instruction.94
Reading instruction has long pitted those who advocate for systematic phonics instruction against those who
advocate for whole-language instruction95--a century-old dispute commonly referred to as the “reading wars.”96 In
the middle of the reading-war spectrum is the *23 reading instructional approach most often used in the United
States today, aptly referred to as “balanced literacy.”97
Whole-language instruction is rooted in the idea that reading is primarily a process of memorizing what words look
like.98 Whole-language proponents believe that the best way to increase reading skills is to “read” many books.
Conversely, systematic phonics instruction is rooted in the idea that reading requires an understanding of the
relationship between sounds and letters.99 To become a skilled reader, a child must first learn to decode individual
words by sounding them out.100 This fundamental decoding skill enables students to orthographically map letters
and words.
Balanced literacy sought to find a happy medium between these two camps. In the late 1990s, it settled into “threecueing,” which teaches beginning readers to sound out the first letter of a word and then look elsewhere to guess
the meaning of the word.101 In other words, three-cueing teaches students to rely on the context of a word to
understand the word, rather than relying on the letters making up the word.102
Reading research shows unequivocally that initial explicit instruction in decoding words by sounding them out is
more effective *24 than either whole-language instruction or balanced literacy.103 It levels the playing field among
students who otherwise have significant differences in prior background knowledge, reading ability, and working
memories.104 Importantly, decoding is a skill that must be taught explicitly. As a biologically secondary skill,
reading does not develop naturally the way that spoken language does.105 Learning to guess words or memorize
them rather than decode them, moreover, interrupts the progression of reading mastery.106
Whole-language instruction is an example of implicit instruction.107 Implicit instruction relies on immersion-putting students into the deep end of the pool while teachers stand on the side, asking questions and throwing out
hints designed to help students figure out how to stay afloat. In contrast, explicit instruction tells students how to
float and how to swim before they get in the pool and offers coaching from the sidelines. Thus, whole-language
reading instruction at its most extreme gives beginning readers books and trusts that they will figure out how to
read them.108 It does not teach students how to decode words using phonics.109
Implicit instruction in legal education is like whole-language reading instruction. It immerses novice law students
in complex texts, *25 confident that their reading coupled with classroom discussion will lead them to
enlightenment and understanding. At its most extreme, it does not provide explicit instruction in vocabulary,
procedural posture of a case, or legal doctrine.
Importantly, the evidence for ideal reading instruction does not say students should get systematic phonics
instruction and nothing else.110 Instead, it simply says the first step in learning to read is learning to decode individual
words rather than guess them. In other words, explicit instruction provides students an essential tool for decoding
the meaning of words on the page. Reading complicated texts is one of the pleasures of reading if the reader knows
most of the words being used.111 When readers must spend all their time decoding individual words, “reading is
harder, slower, and less fun.”112
In other words, the goal of explicit instruction--whether in reading or in the law--is to prepare students for greater
complexity.113 Reading is most interesting when you are reading interesting books. *26 But a reader will never
enjoy the rich world of literature if she cannot first learn the secret of unlocking each word, sound by tedious sound.
8
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Just as letters and sounds are the building blocks of all great literature, so are vocabulary and logic the building
blocks of great legal thinking. Whenever we wonder whether we are making something too obvious, or spoonfeeding our students, a few guideposts can help us logically consider that question.
First, is what we are showing them akin to teaching beginning readers how to decode words by sounding out
individual words? If so, that is not “spoon-feeding” students. That is providing them with basic building blocks and
giving them concrete examples with which to practice.
Second, are we respecting the limits of students as novice learners? Tasks that are easy for experts are surprisingly
complex for novices. Experts have complex schema that make their understanding richer and deeper than a novice's
simple and superficial understanding.114 If we want novices to build their schemas, we must give them opportunities
to practice skills to obtain mastery. Yes, we want to push them out of their comfort zones and into unfamiliar
territory--but when they encounter new vocabulary, new concepts, and complex texts, such as appellate decisions
with layers of meaning, they are being pushed plenty. It is equally important to help students experience success
and build confidence in their ability to learn the law.115 It is important not to cognitively overwhelm them.
*27 III. Cognitive Characteristics of Novices and Experts
Novices think differently than experts.116 They also see problems differently than experts.117 Novices' initial schema
are understandably incomplete and shallow and--importantly--may contain errors.118 Teachers can help students
identify and correct errors in their schema so that subsequent knowledge is correctly assimilated. If they do not,
novices will build their schema on faulty understanding.119
One explanation for why professors may think they are spoonfeeding, while students think professors are hiding
the ball, is their difference in expertise. A person's expertise frames how that person identifies and categorizes a
problem and influences how that person will attempt to solve the problem.120 Whereas experts categorize problems
based on their structure, novices view them superficially.121 In other words, students are not being obstinate when
they do not see how the problem you are asking them to solve is like the problem you just discussed. Prior
knowledge makes deep structure more visible, which necessarily changes one's approach to problem-solving.122
*28 A. Schemas Are Evidence of Expertise
The cascade of thoughts that springs to one's mind unbidden evidences what cognitive science refers to as
“schemas.”123 Experts have richly complex schemas, reflecting the layers of knowledge they have developed over
time. Novices do not. When novices hear new information, they either assimilate it into their existing schemas or
accommodate their existing schemas to adapt to the new knowledge.124 Otherwise, it simply goes in one ear and out
the other.125
As a result of these schemas, experts literally see problems differently than novices do.126 This difference is
attributed in part to the difference in domain-specific knowledge between experts and novices.127 Additionally,
experts' knowledge is contextualized--they recognize when to apply their knowledge--whereas novices' knowledge
is inert; “it has been learned but cannot be accessed for problem solving.”128 Finally, experts are able to retrieve
their knowledge effortlessly, while novices exert tremendous effort to remember and apply what they have
learned.129
*29 These differences reflect the multitude of connections in experts' minds versus the paucity of schema in novices'
minds.130 For civil litigation experts, for example, hearing the phrase “Rule 12(b)(6)” triggers a cascade of related
concepts through their brains. For contracts experts, the word “formation” triggers a similar cascade. But for
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someone who is not an expert in a subject, hearing a word or phrase produces more of a thud. To someone who is
not an expert in microbiology, for example, “microbial antagonism” may trigger them to pay attention and wait for
more or search their brains for other connections that will help them understand. Standing alone, though, the phrase
is meaningless.
B. What Happens When Schema Are Incorrectly Formed?
When learning something for the first time, novices have few schemas to which to connect the information. To
make sense of new information, they try to connect it to existing knowledge. Importantly, they will do so even if
the connection is faulty.131 When we initially misunderstand information, we build a faulty connection. When we
retrieve that memory with its mistaken connection, we strengthen our misunderstanding.132
It is difficult to undo faulty learning. To identify errors in our thinking, we must reveal our mistakes and have them
quickly corrected so that we can reorganize our schemata. Otherwise, retrieving our misunderstandings from longterm memory strengthens the misunderstandings. Getting the test back a week or a month later will not correct
students' misunderstandings unless they are forced to confront their mistakes, grapple with them, and find new
understandings to store in long-term memory. Even then, the new connection may be weak, and the old faulty
connection may be stronger.
*30 For example, when I first saw photos of my friend Natalie's new beau, Spencer, he reminded me of Sheldon
from Big Bang Theory--so I jokingly referred to him by that name. Whenever I texted Natalie about him, I would
use the name Sheldon. When I finally met him a few months later, I called him Sheldon. She said he didn't mind, it
was a fun joke among all of us, but pretty soon I realized I honestly could not remember whether his name was
Spencer or Sheldon. After getting to know him and realizing Natalie really liked him, the joke became old. Basic
respect requires remembering someone's name correctly. But every time I tried to retrieve his name from my
memory, I struggled. I finally confessed to him, hoping that his acceptance would allow me to openly try out names
rather than revert to omitting his name altogether (“Hi! ...”). Not only did he understand, but he also told me that
his name is Princess Diana's family name. That connection worked perfectly for me. Since then, each time I think
of him I hesitate--then I remember Princess Diana and know that his name is Spencer.
This is in many ways a silly example, but it is still highly relevant. I really care about Natalie, and I do not want to
disrespect her new boyfriend. I'm not sure my students similarly care about Torts or Contracts, although they have
varying degrees of motivation to learn and get good grades. My desire to get it right was not enough for me, though.
I could not consistently recall Spencer's name until I could call to mind a conscious concrete thought to guide me
to the proper answer. Because I had remembered his name incorrectly several times, my brain believed that was the
correct name. To override that mistake, I had to consciously think of a guidepost. Having retrieved his name
properly for several months, the connection to Spencer is now thankfully stronger than the connection to Sheldon.
According to educational researcher Graham Nuthall, a student must encounter a new concept on at least three
different occasions to learn it.133 Until then, “the new experience is treated as just another *31 version or aspect of
a known concept and is absorbed into it, or simply forgotten.”134
Imagine, then, how difficult it is to learn a concept in Torts, especially if you misunderstood it initially. Imagine a
student whose working memory was severely overloaded at the beginning of the semester, and who never fully
grasped the concept of legal duty. The student encountered the word “duty” more than three times, giving her brain
sufficient grist to develop a new schema. But duty is an abstract notion. She may have read Palsgraf and listened
to the discussions in class about the differences between Cardozo's and Andrews's opinions. But she cannot
remember which opinion was about duty and which was about proximate cause. She may not remember whether
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Mrs. Palsgraf won or lost. Her knowledge is fuzzy and unstable, making it unlikely she will be able to properly
apply the rules she has been taught to a fact pattern on an exam.
C. Without Developed Schemas, Novices Suffer from Cognitive Overload
When my daughter was learning to drive, a friend asked her, “can you believe people text while they're driving?”
My daughter gave my friend a look of disbelief and said, “I can't even roll down the windows while I'm driving.”
Cognitive psychologists describe that as cognitive overload from a primary task--learning to drive--that interferes
with the ability to accomplish a secondary task--rolling down the windows.
Ten years later, my daughter can not only roll down the windows while she drives, but she can also talk to a
passenger, listen to a podcast, and mentally plan a route to her destination. From a cognitive psychological point of
view, she has become an expert driver. She has developed schemas that allow her to perform most driving tasks
automatically, freeing up her conscious attention for secondary tasks.
First-year law students are like novice drivers. It takes all of the attention they can muster to be prepared for class
and answer the professor's questions.
*32 Because novices have fewer schemas than experts, they must use more of their conscious minds to attend to
new information than experts. New information initially flows through working memory, which is finite and
limited.135 When we hear or read something unfamiliar, we must consciously attend to it. If we do not understand
unfamiliar information, we either discard it or misunderstand it.136
Cognitive load theory differentiates between intrinsic cognitive load, which reflects the complexity of the
information being conveyed, and extrinsic cognitive load, which is imposed on the learner by the teacher's
instructional methods.137 The number of elements--things that must be learned or processed--increases or decreases
extrinsic and intrinsic cognitive load, as does the interactivity of the elements.138 Some material can be learned one
element at a time, and therefore requires minimal working memory.139 Other material requires the learner to process
several elements in working memory at one time, increasing the cognitive load on the learner's working memory.140
For example, learning individual words in a new language can be a low-element task, while speaking in complete
sentences with proper vocabulary, verb conjugation, and syntax presents high element interactivity.141
Because humans' working memories are limited, we can reach a point where we have no more attention to give.142
If you have ever *33 read and reread a paragraph several times, seeing words but not comprehending their meaning,
you have experienced cognitive overload. It may happen because you are thinking about something else or because
you are unfamiliar with what you are reading. Regardless of the impetus, the words are like tiny bricks on a page,
against which you're hitting your head over and over.
The limits of working memory are also observable when you are learning a new language. Because novices must
think about words as they hear them, or before they speak, they generally prefer someone who speaks slowly and
enunciates clearly.143
Law is complicated. Because it has multiple elements that are highly interactive, it has a high intrinsic cognitive
load.144 Novice 1Ls are learning multiple layers of law at once.145 They are learning vocabulary in the context of
appellate decisions that reflect the trial process as well as the appellate process. They are learning law's grammar
and syntax by listening to their professors speak and practicing when called upon.146 Once their working memories
are at maximum processing, unfamiliar words, phrases, and syntax become omnipresent noise.
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When students' working memories are overloaded, they stop learning.147 They do not hear what you are saying, they
do not *34 understand what they are reading, and they cannot follow the classroom conversation. At various times,
students' brains essentially check out. They may not leave the classroom, but they are temporarily unable to process
new information.
D. Managing Cognitive Overload with Explicit Instruction
Why do some students struggle more than others with cognitive overload? First, although working memory is
limited in everyone, some people have more working memory than others.148 Second, some students have existing
knowledge that allows such students to easily and correctly connect new information. Students' background
knowledge may reflect their prior education, work experience, or home environments. The more complex an
individual's background knowledge, the more schemata a person has to connect to and cement new knowledge.
When a student “understands” a concept, the student can process all the necessary elements related to that concept
in working memory.149 One way this occurs is that the student learns the concept. In the language of cognitive
overload theory, she develops schemas that allow her to process a group of interacting elements as a smaller number
of elements.150
Experts do many tasks automatically, which means they devote few working memory resources to initially
processing information. For example, skilled readers decode text automatically, thereby freeing up working memory
resources to use for comprehension.151 Skilled math students do not struggle to remember what three times four is;
they can devote their cognitive resources to thinking more deeply about more abstract mathematical concepts.152
Skilled drivers can both attend to driving and easily roll down their windows.
*35 Students can learn by rote, such as learning multiplication tables, or they can learn with understanding.153 The
ultimate goal in teaching, however, is for students to understand the material, not merely to be able to recite it
without understanding.154 This is what we mean when we say we want students to not merely be able to recite legal
rules, but also to be able to think like lawyers.
Learning foundational knowledge by rote reduces high element interactivity and cognitive load.155 Rote learning is
insufficient to achieve understanding and transfer that knowledge to novel problems.156 However, “it may not be
possible for very high element interactivity material to be simultaneously processed in working memory because
working memory limits may be exceeded.”157 Learning new material element by element, and reducing students'
processing of element interactivity can allow students to develop schemas that will eventually lead to deeper
learning.158
When instructional material has a high intrinsic cognitive load, educators can structure their classes to reduce
extrinsic cognitive load.159 One way to do this is to teach explicitly in small chunks.160 Additional techniques include
checking for understanding through low-stakes quizzes, providing guided practice to promote retrieval and deepen
connections to new and existing schemata, and eventually providing independent practice.161
The limits of working memory and the privilege of prior knowledge offer strong explanations of why traditional
legal education *36 works for some students much better than it does for others.162 Moreover, those students who
grew up in homes where one or more parents were lawyers, or who worked as paralegals or legal assistants before
law school, have more familiarity with legal words, phrases, and concepts. This advantage has never been directly
measured and may last only a few months until other students' background knowledge increases. But given the
structure of law school and the importance of 1L grades, small advantages early in law school can lead to substantial
advantages over time.
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E. The Ultimate Prize: Long-Term Memory
As we become increasingly familiar with information and begin to make sense of it, we develop schemas, which
we store in long-term memory.163 The ability to apply existing knowledge in novel contexts is known in cognitive
psychology as “transfer.”164 Transfer describes *37 the essential differences between a novice and an expert.165 A
novice attends to superficial characteristics of a problem and fails to see structural similarities that facilitate
problem-solving.166 An expert does the opposite.167
Long-term memory appears to be unlimited.168 Every time we retrieve information from long-term memory, we
strengthen the memory of it and forge new connections to other information in our long-term memories.169 From a
cognitive psychology standpoint, encountering something familiar means a person accessed information stored in
long-term memory and used that information to identify something, be it a flower or a legal rule.170 Long-term
memory is a source of substantive and procedural knowledge.171
When something is highly familiar, recognition and cognition are almost instant.172 In other words, experts use
knowledge--stored in long-term memory--to identify and respond to external stimuli without having to really think
about it.173 When a person encounters something unfamiliar, though, long-term memory does not produce an instant
answer. The person must search her memory for analogous patterns or memories of similar things. She must engage
in effortful *38 thinking because she lacks automatic thought. “Indeed, one could define a mental representation as
a conceptual structure designed to sidestep the usual restrictions that short-term memory places on mental
processing.”174
The goal of education is to change long-term memory by developing domain-specific schema that allow for
automatic thinking.175 Extensive schema are the definition of expertise. Developing them takes time and practice;
simply memorizing rules is insufficient.176 Over time, experts' long-term memories give them the ability to recognize
underlying patterns and not be distracted by superficial characteristics.177
The goal of explicit instruction is to prepare students for more complex thinking.178 It is not intended to be an end
in itself.179 Legal education's familiar pedagogical tools are well-designed to press students into higher order
thinking and hone their legal reasoning skills.180
*39 IV. Cognitive Obstacles to Intentional Pedagogy
Understanding students' cognitive structures informs instructional design by reminding educators to respect the
limits of novices' working memories. Additionally, cognitive psychology reveals ways in which legal educators'
expertise can hamper our effectiveness as teachers. First, expertise in any domain leads to an inability to remember
what it was like to be a novice in that domain. This is a cognitive bias known as “the curse of knowledge.” Second,
the desire to teach students to be experts frequently leads educators to teach students as though they are already
experts. Developing awareness of such cognitive biases empowers experts to learn how to teach more effectively.
A. The Curse of Knowledge
Given legal educators' significant expertise, it seems that teaching novice learners should be straightforward and
uncomplicated.181 This is not true primarily due to the difficulty experts have in remembering what it was like to be
a novice, and their inability to recognize that difficulty. This chasm between experts' predictions of how well they
will communicate their knowledge to a novice and novices' actual understanding is known as the “curse of
knowledge.”182 It is a recognized cognitive bias in which the expert's knowledge makes it difficult to remember
what it is like not to have the expert's knowledge.183
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*40 A 1990 research study illustrated this elegantly. Doctoral candidate Elizabeth Newton assigned subjects to be
either tappers or listeners.184 Tappers were given a list of twenty-five well-known songs and instructed to tap out
the song to a listener. Tappers tapped out songs 120 times; listeners correctly guessed the song a mere three times.185
Newton asked the tappers to predict the likelihood that their listeners would correctly guess the song before they
began tapping. Tappers predicted listeners would correctly guess the song 50% of the time.186 In fact, listeners
correctly guessed the song 2.5% of the time, a dramatically different result than the tappers anticipated. Because
the tappers heard the songs in their heads as they tapped, they were “flabbergasted” at how few listeners could hear
the tune.187
Like the tappers who misgauge their listeners' ability to discern a tune the tappers clearly hear in their own heads,
professors overestimate students' prior knowledge and expect students to be able to understand more than students
are capable of comprehending. Students often criticize professors for being opaque in their teaching, while
professors criticize students for not paying sufficient attention.188 Although law professors were once novices, it is
difficult to remember what it was like to not know what we now know.189 We hear the music in our heads, certain
that we need only tap out the tune and at least half of our students will hear it.190
*41 The curse of knowledge shows up in many ways in the law school classroom. A professor may use a legal term
without pausing to make sure students know what it means. A professor may casually refer to a concept from another
doctrinal discipline without checking to ensure students remember that concept--such as mentioning a motion to
dismiss while teaching Torts, or casually referring to the elements of contract formation in a business organizations
class.
Perhaps even more commonly, professors teaching 2L or 3L students assume students learned and retain their
understanding of certain fundamental concepts in their 1L classes. Professors teach from that assumption rather
than revisiting those concepts and shoring them up. Like the tappers, professors are often flabbergasted that their
students cannot hear that which the professor is teaching.
B. Conflating Expertise with Pedagogy
Experts often mistake an educational objective for a pedagogical method.191 Legal education's version of this error
puts students in situations akin to those that lawyers face, causing professors to expect students to discern the law.192
Performing in a domain is not the same as teaching or learning that domain.193 This is the challenge of
apprenticeships. If a student has developed sufficient understanding of a domain, watching an expert perform in
that domain is instructive and *42 illuminating. But what the apprentice sees is informed by the apprentice's
cognitive development in the domain. The less the apprentice knows, the less the apprentice will see and learn.194
When professors explicitly connect a word or phrase to concepts already covered in class, they ensure students are
making correct associations between new and existing knowledge. In other words, they are overriding their curse
of knowledge and helping students create a stable foundation of knowledge and understanding. They are using
explicit instruction to assist their students' learning.
In contrast, a professor using implicit instruction waits for students to figure out the answer, using questions to
guide them. In explicit instruction, students' cognitive resources are directed toward doing the task, not trying to
understand the task. The goal of explicit instruction is to provide students the fundamental knowledge they need so
that they can then learn to apply that knowledge to solve legal problems.195
The phrase “spoon-feeding” implies that students are babies whose only function is to open their mouths so that
teachers can fill them up with knowledge, invoking an image of complete passivity.196 The spoon-feeding metaphor
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is often misconstrued, however. On the one hand, a passive student is not likely to learn or develop expertise. On
the other hand, novice learners must expend tremendous cognitive *43 energy to process new information.197
Educators who see law students as passive learners incorrectly understand cognitive learning theory.
Human brains are constantly seeking patterns to help them make sense of their world.198 When they do so
unconsciously, without monitoring, they invariably make mistakes. Explicit instruction anticipates those mistakes,
monitors students' understanding for them, and intervenes quickly and repeatedly to correct them.
The uniformity of 1L doctrinal pedagogy across law schools reflects a belief that implicit instruction is essential to
fostering students' ability to reason and solve legal problems. Professor McClurg's suggestion that explicit doctrinal
instruction inhibits student learning is integral to the academy's pedagogical narrative. But these notions of how
students learn law, which inform how the academy teaches law, are rooted in ideas of law as a science,199 not in
science.
According to the prevailing mythology of legal pedagogy, being confused is good and natural. “Just be patient,” we
say to our students. “One day--we're not sure when, or why, or how--the light will go on and the fog will lift!” If a
student never has that experience, he is by definition an outsider, relegated to a role that has no name and no identity.
Explicit instruction in the early stages of learning promotes accurate, thorough understanding of foundational legal
knowledge. When students have a solid foundation of knowledge, they are ready to engage in higher-order
thinking.200 If we require students to think about topics without first acquiring knowledge about that topic, we *44
must be prepared for superficial thinking.201 If we want students to engage in deeper thinking, we must ensure they
have sufficient knowledge to do so.
Intentional explicit instruction is not, therefore, a matter of giving students the right answer.
At its best, explicit instruction models for students how to engage in relevant procedures, gives students multiple
opportunities to practice those procedures with immediate feedback, and gradually cedes control over the procedure
to students.202 Some students will learn more quickly than others, and some students will learn more deeply than
others--just as in implicit instruction. But the available evidence suggests that more students will learn with initial
explicit instruction than without. Rather than talk to students as mini-experts, explicit instruction shows students
the path, provides them tools, and allows them to practice using those tools.
V. Practicing Initial Explicit Instruction
Legal education that relies on implicit instruction excels at teaching certain students the essential skills of lawyering.
Explicit instruction used intentionally throughout the curriculum can, however, serve to reach more students early
in law school to help their schema form correctly and provide a solid base for them for the rest of their careers.
Explicit instruction is designed to assist novice learners construct accurate schema. Explicit instruction is not meant
to replace implicit instruction, but rather is intended to precede it and periodically appear when a student reveals a
foundational misunderstanding of legal doctrine or procedure. Below are some examples of how explicit instruction
can be deployed in the law school classroom.
*45 A. Theory in Action: An Example
A recent article about teaching legal analysis provides an example of explicit instruction as well as the academy's
ambivalence toward it. Before sharing with readers his detailed pedagogical approach to teaching legal analysis,
Charles Splawn asks “whether it is advisable for law teachers to decode law school learning at all.”203 Splawn
explains, “[c]ertainly one camp of faculty would argue that the onus should be on the students to figure out how to
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learn law largely on their own.”204 Splawn further observes that a lawyer's role is to problem-solve for others and
concedes that “many of today's students need to improve their resourcefulness and become more self-reliant.”205
Still, he concludes that although explicit instruction may not be ideal, it is essential. According to Splawn, “for
whatever reasons (hello high schools and universities), too many law students falter at deep doctrinal learning unless
we in the academy proactively instill in them the foundational thought process of legal analysis.”206
Splawn demonstrates several facets of the academy's ambivalence toward explicit instruction. He begins by asking
whether it is appropriate to teach law students the process of legal reasoning explicitly. He acknowledges the
overriding cultural myth that students should learn on their own, ascribing it to “one camp” of faculty.207 He *46
concludes that explicit instruction is appropriate primarily based on his own experience--his students learn more
when he teaches them explicitly. His article reflects deeply considered pedagogy that could be a model for all in the
academy. Why does he believe it necessary to engage in this soliloquy? I believe it is because his pedagogical
approach subverts the dominant paradigm.
Splawn teaches students the process of legal analysis, itself a deconstructive process, by explicitly deconstructing
the process into discrete steps.208 He models this process in “every single class.”209 Specifically, he teaches students
to (1) deconstruct governing rules into their elements, (2) match facts to rule elements, (3) identify facts that tend
to prove or disprove each element, (4) assess the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and counterargument,
and (5) communicate one's reasoning in writing.210 Half of each class is devoted to working through this process for
a hypothetical problem students read before class.211 He works with students to build a chart of each analytical step
on a whiteboard.212 Over the course of the semester, students begin taking over the professor's role as facilitator in
class--a pedagogical step known as “scaffolding.”213
*47 Despite his methodical and thoughtful teaching, Splawn is uncertain enough in his belief that explicit instruction
is an effective way to teach law that he feels compelled to acknowledge those who advocate for implicit learning.
A professor who pulls back the curtain to reveal fundamental concepts and processes to students levels the playing
field and increases the “stickiness” of his students' brains, making it more likely they will learn more in every class
they take thereafter.214
As a practical matter, many professors use explicit instruction in their classrooms for the simple reason that
discovery approaches either do not work or take too long.215 For many professors, their version of explicit instruction
means asking a question and waiting--and when no answer is forthcoming, giving the answer. Students quickly
learn to just wait long enough. This approach is aptly described as “spoonfeeding.” Students did not have to practice
any analytical steps to reach that answer or in any way engage their effortful brains. This is not what properly
delivered explicit instruction looks like.
B. Teach in Small Steps
In recognition of students' limited working memories, effective teachers present new material in small steps.216
Cognitive research, moreover, tells us that students remember what they pay attention to. When novice learners are
being taught new material, it is imperative that the professor do all she can to control the students' attention.
Attention is a limited resource. It is the gateway to students' working memories, which are fragile and finite. Giving
students bite-sized chunks of information followed by adequate time to process that information into long-term
memory can reduce cognitive overload and deepen student learning.
Effective teachers have a tightly planned and short lesson with a clear idea of what they want students to learn.
Effective teachers may then ask students to break into pairs to tell each other, for example, three things the teacher
just said that are important to the topic being taught. Alternatively, students can summarize for the other student the
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*48 main points they just heard, giving them each no more than two minutes. Following this period of sharing,
students can then come back to the larger classroom discussion and various pairs can report their summaries.
C. Provide Necessary Background Knowledge
In recognition of the variability among students' background knowledge, effective teachers provide necessary
background knowledge to ensure proper schemata formation. This can range from providing a big-picture
understanding of the overall subject to slowly reviewing new vocabulary and checking for students' understanding
of key words and phrases. For example, if you use your own course materials rather than a textbook, make sure you
include a table of contents. Refer to the table of contents throughout the semester to remind students of where in
the larger picture the day's lesson fits.
It can also be helpful to preview assigned readings.217 A brief oral preview can give students the necessary
background to help them better comprehend the reading.218 If the reading introduces new concepts, tell them what
those concepts are, and, if possible, provide both an example of each concept as well as a counterexample.219 Being
explicit in what students will encounter, how to prepare, what to look for, and even what questions to ask or answer
can assist students in their learning.220
*49 Finally, it can also be helpful to include a list of vocabulary words for any given day or week. This focuses
students' attention on the words they know they will learn, priming their attention before they read, and signaling
to them that these are important words to review when studying.
D. Provide Scaffolding and Withdraw it Gradually
One type of scaffolded instruction is a teaching strategy sometimes referred to as “I do--we do--you do.”221 Scaffolds
can also refer to diagrams, graphs, or other visual organizers that support students' developing knowledge.222
Importantly, if scaffolds are taken away too quickly, “learning does not occur and the learner becomes frustrated in
the process.”223
In “I do” instruction, the professor explicitly models for students what she wants the students to do. For example,
at the beginning of the semester the professor explains the day's cases to the class the way she wants students to
explain them when called upon to brief a case. Throughout the semester, moreover, the professor gives students
practice problems that are similar in structure and content to the questions she will use on the midterm or final exam.
“We do” instruction is an easy step to overlook, yet it is one of the simplest to implement and the most useful to
students. Doing a problem together as a class is an example of “we do.” Bar prep courses *50 that provide lecture
notes with blanks to be filled in by students are using “we do” instruction. Similarly, giving students the skeleton
of a case brief and filling it out together in class allows them a safe way to practice the skill being asked of them
and ensures that their misunderstandings do not remain uncorrected.
“You do” instruction is the part of the spectrum with which we are most familiar. Midterms and exams are an
example of “you do” instruction. During this step, we give students an exam and expect them to use the knowledge
they've gained in class to perform with mastery. Unfortunately, it doesn't always work out that way.
Scaffolding is also evidenced in “worked problems.”224 Other examples include providing students an outline of
your lecture with only the headings and subheadings filled in.225 Essentially, anything you provide your students to
assist them in focusing their attention where you want them to focus it is a scaffold.226
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Splawn outlines a common classroom approach to scaffolding.227 He deconstructs the process of legal reasoning for
students and makes explicit each step of the process so that students can practice methodically. He does not expect
students to glean underlying structure from superficial details-- something novice learners are notoriously poor at
doing.228 Instead, he makes fundamental concepts and procedures explicit so that students can learn the skill of legal
analysis and practice it consistently. He does not expect students to hear something once and learn it.229 He provides
time and space for his students *51 to watch him deconstruct legal analysis (“I do”), practice the process in class
several times (“we do”), and finally complete an assignment on their own (“you do”).
E. Provide Low-Stakes Retrieval Practice
If our goal is to ensure students are learning what we are teaching, we must understand where their understanding
goes astray. A significant disadvantage of traditional implicit instruction is that it rarely includes regular monitoring
of students' misunderstandings and mistakes.230 Because of that, professors may proceed through a semester blithely
believing that students have a more solid understanding of the foundational material than they really do.
One of the most useful ways to check for students' understanding, also familiar to law professors, is to ask questions.
Questions are tools with which professors can probe and correct students' developing schemas. Another useful tool
is “retrieval practice,” otherwise known as quizzes or tests. Retrieving information from memory is one of the most
effective ways to learn.231 Whenever we give students an answer without first giving them time to come up with the
answer on their own, we rob them of an opportunity to learn.232 This is the “spoon-feeding” disparaged by the
academy.
Retrieval practice refers generally to the act of retrieving information from memory, which strengthens the memory
and deepens the learning.233 Of course, if the information that is retrieved is incorrect, the misunderstanding will be
strengthened. For that reason, retrieval practice operates most effectively when professors can check students'
understanding and either fill in gaps or correct misunderstandings. Retrieval practice also complements explicit
instruction by allowing a *52 professor to check for student understanding.234 It creates opportunities for immediate
explicit intervention to correct misunderstandings as well as elaborate on topics that have been introduced but not
yet deeply explored.
Retrieval practice is also useful for professors' understanding of their students learning. Making explicit connections
between new concepts and old concepts ensures that students are learning what you want them to learn. Giving
them opportunities to retrieve those connections from their brains strengthens their learning and makes their
understanding (or misunderstanding) visible to you for immediate correction. This combination of initial explicit
instruction and retrieval practice is a concrete, evidence-supported approach to ensuring that students are learning
that which you are teaching them.235 Further, while students who engage orally in class reveal their understanding
to a professor, quieter students stay under a professor's radar. It is far too easy to look around the classroom after
explaining a concept and conclude from the smiles and nods that students followed your explanation or the class
discussion, and now share your understanding. Until you test their understanding, you cannot know whether
students learned what you think you taught them.
Low-stakes retrieval practice refers to assessments that are either ungraded or comprise a very small portion of
students' grades.236 Quizzes are one example of low-stakes retrieval practice. For example, I use quizzes to ensure
students read before class and to focus their attention on the important points from the reading. I usually include 10
questions--multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, and short-answer essay questions.237
*53 I often begin class with a “minute memo” in which I ask students to write down three things they remember
from our last class.238 I encourage them not to look at their notes and remind them that the act of retrieving something
from memory strengthens learning. After giving them about three minutes to complete the minute memo, I ask them
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to share what they remembered. We spend 15-20 minutes reviewing and clarifying the previous day's material.
Sometimes I ask them to turn in their minute memos, but just as often I do not.
In this way, I leverage student engagement to deepen their learning. I use to begin class by reviewing the previous
class. The difference with the minute memo is that students engage in retrieval practice, and the subsequent review
reveals gaps in their understanding. It is driven by the students rather than by me.239
F. Create a “Culture of Error”
Underlying all of these ideas is what one educational researcher calls a “culture of error” in the classroom--making
the classroom a safe environment where students know that they can and will make mistakes and that they will
never by shamed or criticized for those mistakes.240 Much has been written about modifying traditional Socratic
technique to reduce student anxiety and increase the technique's usefulness.241 Examples include allowing students
to notify you ahead of *54 class that they had a bad night, are not feeling well, or have some other reason for not
wanting to be called on that day and allowing students to ask for help from co-counsel.
G. Provide Problems After Basic Knowledge Is Established
Once students have the basic building blocks of a concept--the professor has provided direct instruction in relevant
background knowledge, taught students the key elements of the lesson, and checked for student understanding--the
students are ready to apply what they are learning. Professors can then give students a problem, allow them three
to four minutes to work on it themselves, and then ask students to pair with a classmate and discuss before coming
back for a full class discussion. Professors can then call on pairs to report their answers, being sure to ask how they
arrived at those answers.
When students work problems, they are applying knowledge. This is not only a prized skill in the law, it deepens
learning by assisting students in creating connections to new and existing knowledge. Because the problems are
being done one at a time, professors can check student understanding and correct misunderstandings before moving
on to another problem with similar structure.
At this stage of learning, the goal is to cement students' understanding of key concepts and ensure those concepts
are accurately understood so that students are building a strong foundation of basic knowledge that will enable them
to engage in more sophisticated analysis down the road.
H. Renounce Your Coverage Obsession
When teaching a doctrinal subject, many professors feel compelled to cover a multitude of concepts. There are so
many good reasons for this: we want to provide an accurate understanding of a particular area of law (how can they
understand negligence if they don't understand intentional torts?); certain concepts are essential to understanding
the overall doctrine (how can students understand Contracts if they don't understand formation?); or certain concepts
are likely to show up on the bar exam or in practice, and we want to prepare our students. As laudable as our
concerns are, they are undermined by the *55 fact that students who are experiencing cognitive overload will
remember very little of what we cover.242
If we are committed to deepening student learning, we must acknowledge that we are lawyers, not cognitive
psychologists. We are probably unfamiliar with evidence-based pedagogy. We are experts in many things-including classroom teaching--but our subjective experiences may be blinding us to research-based pedagogical
techniques.243 Worse, the cultural mythology of implicit instruction may make us feel ashamed for using more
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explicit instructional techniques. Although our expertise may be primarily in the doctrinal areas in which we teach
and do scholarship, and not in cognitive psychology or the science of learning, we can learn teaching techniques
that will improve our students' learning.
VI. Conclusion
Legal education too often teaches students how to be lawyers by teaching them as though they already are lawyers.
Like other disciplines, legal education fails to consistently recognize the meaningful cognitive differences between
novices and experts. Novice learners use their existing schema to make sense of what happens in the classroom.
Blinded by the curse of knowledge and loathe to ruin students' future as creative thinkers, law professors frequently
teach novice learners as though they are mini-experts--assuming, omitting, and rushing.
Explicit instruction is an important pedagogical tool that should be used intentionally and thoughtfully in the law
school classroom. Law is not so special that it has its own pedagogical rules. Cognitive psychology research
supports initial explicit instruction in new domains--even law.
To the extent law schools expect students' background knowledge and skills to buoy them through their first year
of law school, they are allowing students' privilege to leverage them into higher grades and more prestigious jobs.
Consciously integrating explicit instruction into doctrinal classes can make our pedagogy more intentional and our
law schools more inclusive.
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Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives 259 (Lorin W. Anderson, David R. Krathwohl, Peter W.
Airasian, Kathleen A. Cruikshank, Richard E. Mayer, Paul R. Pintrich, James Raths, & Merlin C. Wittrock
eds., 2001) (describing many modern versions of the Taxonomy). As refinements to the original Taxonomy,
they accept the underlying premise, i.e., that human thought can be studied and categorized, and that those
categories can inform our teaching.

84

Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, supra note 34, at 18.
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85

Id.

86

See generally Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, supra note 34. See also Michael T. Gibson, A
Critique of Best Practices in Legal Education: Five Things All Law Professors Should Know, 42 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 1, 7-8 (2012).

87

Gibson, supra note 86, at 10-12.

88

Roy Lyster & Hirohide Mori, Instructional Counterbalance in Immersion Pedagogy, in Pathways to
Multilingualism: Evolving Perspectives on Immersion Education 133 (Tara Williams Fortune & Diane J.
Tedick eds., 2008).

89

See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer”” (2007).

90

Natalie Wexler, The Knowledge Gap: The Hidden Cause of America's Broken Education System--and How
to Fix It (2019). The lack of fundamental knowledge reported by Ms. Wexler is shocking. High school
teachers report students who “may confuse the Civil War and the civil rights movement.” Id. at 21. “They
may think Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King Jr. were contemporaries.” Id. Some “don't understand
the difference between a country and a continent, or between a city and a state.” Id. Ms. Wexler locates the
genesis of these gaps in first, second, and third grades, with schools' emphasis on practicing skills at the
expense of teaching students substantive knowledge. Id.

91

“The relationship between fact learning and higher order learning is often speculated, but empirically
unknown.” Pooja K. Agarwal, Retrieval Practice & Bloom's Taxonomy: Do Students Need Fact Knowledge
Before Higher Order Learning?, 111 J. Educ. Psych. 189, 193 (2019). Agarwal conducted several
experiments to better understand the relationship and found that “building a foundation of factual knowledge
via retrieval practice did not enhance students' higher order learning.” Id. at 202. However, it is not clear
that Agarwal's subjects were learning an entirely new subject the way law students are. Law students' prior
background knowledge may be influencing their early law school success.

92

Educational researcher Pooja Agarwal's recent research explores whether factual knowledge must precede
higher-order thinking and concludes that it does not. See Agarwal, supra note 91. She concludes, “[w]hether
a foundation of factual knowledge promotes higher order learning--and under what conditions--remains to
be seen.” Id. at 203. Agarwal's research did not rest on factual knowledge that was entirely unfamiliar to
students the way that legal doctrine is entirely unfamiliar to many 1Ls and does not change the fundamental
premise of this article--basic legal doctrine and the process of higher-order legal reasoning are best taught
through initial explicit instruction.

93

See Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, supra note 34.

94

See generally Greg Ashman, Opinion, “Inquiry Learning” May Backfire, Education Next: Blog,
https://www.educationnext.org/inquiry-learning-may-back-fire-teaching-math/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2019);
Barton, supra note 82; Craig Barton, Reflect, Expect, Check, Explain: Sequences and Behaviour to Enable
Mathematical Thinking in the Classroom (2020); Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note 21, at 150-51
(discussing the use--and weaknesses--of discovery instruction in science education).
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95

See generally Ken Goodman, On Reading (1996); Ken Goodman, What's Whole in Whole Language in the
21st Century (2014).

96

Peter Gray, The Reading Wars: Why Natural Learning Fails in Classrooms, Psych. Today (Nov. 19, 2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/freedom-learn/201311/the-reading-wars-why-natural-learningfails-in-classrooms;
Nicholas
Lemann,
The
Reading
Wars,
Atlantic
(Nov.
1997),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/11/the-reading-wars/376990/; Timothy Shanahan,
Have the Reading Wars Become Research Wars?, Reading Rockets (May 22, 2019),
https://www.readingrockets.org/blogs/shanahan-literacy/have-reading-wars-become-research-wars.

97

“Balanced literacy” was intended to find a middle ground between whole-language proponents and phonicsfirst proponents. Emily Hanford, At a Loss for Words: How a Flawed Idea Is Teaching Millions of Kids to
Be Poor Readers, Am. Pub. Media: Reps. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/episode/2019/08/22/whats-wrong-how-schools-teach-reading.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Three Cueing Systems, Reading Strategies, https://edla369readingstrat-egies.weebly.com/three-cueingsystems.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2021); see also Hanford, supra note 97.

102

Hanford, supra note 97. (“Experiments that force people to use context to predict words show that even
skilled readers can correctly guess only a fraction of the words ....”).

103

Hanford, supra note 97; Dana Goldstein, An Old and Contested Solution to Boost Reading Scores: Phonics,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.ny-times.com/2020/02/15/us/reading-phonics.html.

104

Hanford, supra note 97; see also Peter Dewitz, Legal Education: A Problem of Learning from Text, 23
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 225, 226 (1997) (“What readers know determines what they will
comprehend.”).

105

See supra Section I.B (discussing law as biologically secondary knowledge).

106

Hanford, supra note 97. Unfortunately, the predominant reading method in the United States for the past
few decades is rooted in teaching students to guess words rather than decode them. Id.; Three Cueing
Systems, supra note 101.

107

Marilyn Jager Adams, Why Not Phonics and Whole Language, in All Language and the Creation of Literacy
40 (W. Ellis ed., 1991), reprinted by Donald L. Potter (Jan. 21, 2008),
https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/5cdc8al08dfc8cb0517030e2/t/5d9cecfl7dfe444c09fc4973/157056536
2757/Why+Not+Phonics+and+Whole+Language_.Moats.pdf.
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108

Kenneth S. Goodman, Reading: A Psycholinguistic Guessing Game, in Theoretical Models & Processes of
Reading 497 (Harry Singer & Robert B. Ruddell eds., 2d ed. 1976).

109

Adams, supra note 107, at 4.

110

See Keith Rayner, Barbara R. Foorman, Charles A. Perfetti, David Pesetsky, & Mark S. Seidenberg, How
Psychological Science Informs the Teaching of Reading, 2 Psych. Sci. Pub. Int. 31 (2001),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2590161_How_psychological_science_informs_the_teaching_of
_reading; Anne Castes, Kathleen Rastle, & Kate Nation, Ending the Reading Wars: Reading Acquisition
from
Novice
to
Expert,
19
Psych.
Sci.
Pub.
Int.
5
(2018),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1529100618772271.

111

Daniel T. Willingham, The Reading Mind: A Cognitive Approach to Understanding How the Mind Reads
89 (2017). “Studies that have measured readers' tolerance of unfamiliar vocabulary estimate that readers
need to know about 98% of the words for comfortable comprehension.” Id. at 90. It is difficult to imagine
that any 1L knows 98% of the words in an appellate opinion.

112

Willingham, supra note 111, at 89. Scholars have long observed a connection between law students' reading
ability and their academic success. See, e.g., Dewitz, supra note 104, at 226; Ian Gallacher, “Who Are These
Guys?”: The Results of a Survey Studying the Information Literacy of Incoming Law Students, 44 Cal. W.
L. Rev. 151 (2007); Leah Christensen, Legal Reading and Success in Law School: An Empirical Study, 30
Seattle U. L. Rev. 603 (2007); Leah Christensen, The Paradox of Legal Expertise: A Study of Experts &
Novices Reading the Law, 2008 BYU Educ. & L.J. 53; Jane B. Grisé, Good Critical Reading Strategies Can
Improve Legal Writing, 82 Bench & Bar 30 (2018); Carolyn V. Williams, #CriticalReading
#WickedProblem, 44 S. Ill. U. L.J. 179 (2020); Patricia Grande Montana, Bridging the Reading Gap in the
Law School Classroom, 45 Cap. U. L. Rev. 433 (2017); Of Moby Dick & Tartar Sauce, supra note 3, at 136
(discussing declines in reading skills).

113

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 64.

114

See infra Section III.A.

115

Students' motivation is tied to their perception that they are learning. See Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note
21, at 98-104 (discussing Bernard Weiner, An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion,
92 Psych. Rev. 548 (1985)).

116

For a helpful schematic illustrating the relationship between a person's prior knowledge and the problemsolving process they employ, see Timothy Nokes-Malach, Christian D. Schunn, & Michelene T.H. Chi,
Problem Solving and Human Expertise, in 5 International Encyclopedia of Education 265, 266 (Penelope
Peterson, Eva Baker, & Barry McGaw eds., 3d ed. 2010).

117

See Michelene T.H. Chi, Paul J. Feltovich, & Robert Glaser, Categorization and Representation of Physics
Problems by Experts and Novices, 5 Cognitive Sci. 121, 122 (1979) (“It is well known by now that the
quality of a problem representation influences the ease with which a problem can be solved.”) (citing Herbert
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A. Simon & John R. Hayes, The Understanding Process: Problem Isomorphs, 8 Cognitive Psych. 165
(1976); Newell & Simon, supra note 26).
118

Id.

119

See id.

120

See id.

121

Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note 21, at 5 (discussing Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, supra note 117).

122

Id. at 6.

123

First coined by Jean Piaget in 1952, the term “schema” refers to a mental structure that organizes and
categorizes information. Id. In discussing chess masters' schema, one researcher wrote, “a schema is defined
as a structure which allows problem solvers to recognize a problem state as belonging to a particular category
of problem states that normally require particular moves.” Sweller, supra note 26, at 259.

124

Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note 21, at 8-9 (discussing Piaget and the processes of assimilation and
accommodation). The third option is to discard the new information. Id.

125

I have long imagined novices' brains as laundry chutes, which are smooth-sided so that nothing gets caught
on the way down. Without schema-- mental hooks in their brains--students' brains have nothing with which
to catch new information. It comes in and sails out.

126

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 147. Phillip Kellman of UCLA has used this observation to develop a program
to train novice pilots' ability to spot problems on an airplane instrument panel. Benedict Carey, How We
Learn: The Surprising Truth About When, Where, and Why It Happens 185-90 (2014).

127

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 147. Notice that this observation applies regardless of the domain and explains
why a plumber sees your pipes differently than a non-plumber does as fully as it explains why lawyers notice
things that non-lawyers do not.

128

Id. at 148.

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

See Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, supra note 117, at 122; Willingham, supra note 2, at 94-95.

132

Memory is not like a file drawer; we do not open it up and look through it to find something. Instead, memory
is a constructive process. Yana Weinstein & Megan Sumeracki, Understanding How We Learn: A Visual
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Guide 67-68 (2019) (citing Daniel L. Schacter, Memory: An Adaptive Constructive Process, in Memory: A
History 291 (Dmitri Nikulin ed., 2015)).
133

Graham Nuthall, The Hidden Lives of Learners 63 (2007). Based on this observation, and with detailed
observations of the number of times a teacher discussed a new concept, Nuthall's team could predict with
80-85% accuracy which students would learn the concept and which ones would not. Id. at 63-73.
Importantly, an “encounter” may involve an inference from other information. Id. at 69.

134

Id. at 73. “In the normal course of events, this processing takes place unconsciously.” Id.

135

Nelson Cowan, Working Memory Capacity 3 (Classic ed. 2016). In contrast, long-term memory “never
reaches a point at which new experiences can no longer be committed to memory; the brain cannot be full.”
Id. at 1; see also Nelson Cowan, What Are the Differences Between Long-Term, Short-Term, and Working
Memory?, 169 Progress Brain Rsch. 323 (2008).

136

See Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Piaget's theory of assimilation
and accommodation). Educational researcher Graham Nuthall believes a student must encounter a new
concept on at least three different occasions to learn it. Nuthall, supra note 133, at 63. (“If the information
was incomplete, or not experienced on three different occasions, the student did not learn the concept.”).

137

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 57.

138

Id. at 58.

139

Id. at 58-59.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

When total cognitive load--intrinsic plus extrinsic--exceeds the limits of a student's working memory,
“processing necessary information may become difficult and so learning may cease.” Id. at 67.

143

One of the most important phrases a new Spanish speaker can learn is, “mas despacio, por favor”--“slow
down, please.” Recognizing this, a podcast gives novice language learners opportunities to practice
comprehension by listening to news at slower speeds than regular news broadcasts. See News in Slow
Spanish Live!, News in Slow Spanish, https://www.newsinslowspanish.com/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).

144

Highly interactive material is difficult to learn. Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 61. When the
elements are also difficult to learn on their own, the material can be “exceptionally difficult to learn.” Id.

145

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 150 (explaining how whether the student is learning law or science, the student
first must acquire “a broad, critical knowledge of the particular subject matter through formal learning
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processes”) (citing William C. Kyle, Jr., The Distinction Between Inquiry and Scientific Inquiry and Why
High School Students Should be Cognizant of the Distinction, 17 J. Rsch. Sci. Teaching 123 (1980)).
146

Mertz, supra note 89. Mertz studied the acquisition of legal language in law school classrooms from a
linguistic anthropological point of view, concluding that learning to speak, write, and think like a lawyer is
“an initiation into a particular linguistic and textual tradition found in our society.” Id. at 3-4.

147

My first introduction to the concept of cognitive overload came at a AALS 2007 workshop for new law
teachers. Alison Grey Anderson of UCLA used the image of geese who are force-fed to produce paté as a
metaphor for law students who are incapable of digesting more information.

148

See generally Cowan, supra note 135.

149

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 62.

150

Id. at 64. “A major function of learning is to dramatically reduce element interactivity and intrinsic cognitive
load by incorporating interacting elements into schemas.” Id. at 65.

151

See generally Willingham, supra note 111.

152

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 63-64.

153

Id. at 62.

154

Id. at 64.

155

Id. at 63.

156

Id. A student's ability to apply knowledge to a novel situation is known as “transfer.” Willingham, supra
note 2, at 97; see also supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.

157

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 64.

158

Id.

159

Id. at 67-68.

160

Id. at 64 (citing Edwina Pollock, Paul Chandler, & John Sweller, Assimilating Complex Information, 12
Learning & Instruction 61 (2002)).

161

See Dani Brecher Cook & Kevin Michael Klipfel, How Do Our Students Learn? An Outline of a Cognitive
Psychological Model for Information Literacy Instruction, 55 Reference & User Servs. Q. 34 (2015).
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162

“Individual differences in [working memory] capacity are associated with variation in several important
abilities, including control of attention, non-verbal reasoning ability and academic performance.” Christos
Constantinidis & Torkel Klingberg, The Neuroscience of Working Memory Capacity and Training, 17
Nature Revs. Neuroscience 438, 438 (2016) (citing Michael J. Kane, Leslie H. Brown, Jennifer C. McVay,
Paul J. Silva, Inez Myin-Germeys, & Thomas R. Kwapil, For Whom the Mind Wanders, and When: An
Experience-Sampling Study of Working Memory and Executive Control in Daily Life, 18 Psych. Sci. 614
(2007); Patrick C. Kyllonen & Raymond E. Christal, Reasoning Ability is (Little More Than) WorkingMemory Capacity?!, 14 Intelligence 389 (1990); Susan E. Gathercole, Leanne Brown, & Susan J. Pickering,
Working Memory Assessments at School Entry as Longitudinal Predictors of National Curriculum
Attainment Levels, 20 Educ. & Child Psych. 109 (2003)).

163

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 64-65.

164

Susan M. Barnett & Stephen M. Ceci, When and Where Do We Apply What We Learn? A Taxonomy for Far
Transfer, 128 Psych. Bull. 612, 613 (2002). “Near” transfer involves applying learning from one context to
a closely related but novel context. Jose Mestre, Transfer of Learning: Issues and Research Agenda 3 (2002).
“Far transfer refers both to the ability to use what was learned in one setting to a different one as well as the
ability to solve novel problems that share a common structure with the knowledge initially acquired.” Id. A
student's ability to transfer knowledge is evidence of deep learning. Barnett & Ceci, supra, at 613;
Willingham, supra note 2, at 97.

165

Carey, supra note 126, at 155 (describing transfer as “the ability to extract the essence of a skill or formula
or word problem and apply it in another context, to another problem that may not look the same, at least
superficially”).

166

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 147.

167

Id.

168

See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing Cowan).

169

See generally Pooja K. Agarwal & Patrice M. Bain, Powerful Teaching: Unleash the Science of Learning
(2019); Weinstein & Sumeracki, supra note 132, at 118-34; Christopher, supra note 73, at 50-51 (discussing
retrieval in the context of law school).

170

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 18-19.

171

See generally Cowan, supra note 135 and accompanying text.

172

Cognitive psychology refers to this as automaticity. Willingham, supra note 2, at 111. Experts' schemas are
stored in long-term memory, allowing them to do certain cognitive tasks automatically, i.e., without much
conscious thought. Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 48-50.

173

Importantly, expertise must be specific to a domain. “You don't train your memory; you train your memory
for strings of digits or for collections of words or for people's faces. You don't train to become an athlete;
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you train to become a gymnast or a sprinter or a marathoner or a swimmer or a basketball player.” Ericsson
& Pool, supra note 33, at 60.
174

Id. at 61.

175

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note l, at 24. The expert's automatic thinking allows her to get to the heart
of solving the problem more quickly. Solving the problem is not automatic; recognizing and evaluating the
problem are.

176

Id. at 20-24 (discussing chess grandmasters' expertise in recognizing a chess board within a few seconds).

177

It is worth noting the importance of time in developing expertise. Psychologist K. Anders Ericsson first
posited the notion that to be an expert, one must put in 10,000 hours of practice. K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf
Th. Krampe, & Clemens Tesch-Romber, The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert
Performance, 100 Psych. Rev. 363 (1993). Ericsson has clarified that practice must be purposeful if it is to
lead to expertise; “naïve” practice is insufficient. Ericsson & Pool, supra note 33, at 14-22. Almost by
definition, law students will not become experts while in law school. Our goal instead is to help them develop
a foundation of accurate knowledge to prepare them to develop the initial schema and habits of deliberate
practice that will sustain their evolution from novice law student to expert lawyer.

178

Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, supra note 1, at 64.

179

This is true whether explicit instruction is being used in a 1L classroom or in bar review. All parts of the
academy strive to teach students how to engage in legal analysis--whether in a doctrinal course, a legal
writing course, a clinic, or a bar prep course. We generally agree on the ultimate destination; it is the various
methods for getting there that are being considered here.

180

Whereas some disciplines struggle to deepen students' learning, legal education excels at pedagogical
techniques aimed at intermediate and advanced learners. It is less assured in the initial stages of learning.

181

Legal educators are hired primarily because of their expertise in the law. Recognizing this, the Association
of American Law Schools offers an annual workshop for new law professors.

182

Chip Heath & Dan Heath, Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die 114-15 (Hardcover ed.
2008).

183

See, e.g., DeAnna Myers, Problem Solving Knowledge Transfer: An Expert's Perspective, Nw. Sch. Educ.
& Soc. Pol'y (Dec. 2012) https://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/masters-learning-and-organizationalchange/knowledge-lens/stories/2013/problem-solving-knowledge-transfer-an-experts-perspective.html.
Myers surveyed engineers with more than 10 years' experience (experts) and less than four years' experience
(novices) at an engineering firm. Experts had developed or taught at least one class for in-house novice
engineers, and novices had completed at least one such class. 75% of the experts believed it was not difficult
to predict novice learning needs and adjust class instruction accordingly, and 95% believed they had done
so successfully, although most would have made more adjustments had they had more time. Id. 82.5%) of
the experts reported that novices in their courses learned the material and could apply it. Id.
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184

Newton's study was apparently not published but has been discussed extensively in subsequent literature.
See, e.g., Heath & Heath, supra note 182, at 19-21.

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 20.

188

Myers, supra note 183. Novices and experts disagreed about how well the novices learned, whether the order
of presentation was logical, whether technical terms were understandable, and whether the experts provided
sufficient detail for novices to apply. Id. The two groups agreed only on whether the complexity of the class
material was appropriate for novice learners. Id.

189

Heath & Heath, supra note 182, at 278 (“If you're a biology teacher, you simply can't imagine anymore what
it's like to hear the word ‘mitosis' for the first time, or to lack the knowledge that the body is composed of
cells.”)

190

Chip and Dan Heath suggest the remedy for the curse of knowledge is to make the abstract more concrete.
Id. at 114-15. Their advice is aimed primarily at business owners and is especially apt for lawyers who are
preparing for trial or writing briefs about cases with which they are deeply familiar. For law professors,
however, being advised to teach more concretely is not necessarily as useful as being advised to teach more
explicitly.

191

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 149 (“The error here is that no distinction is made between the behaviors and
methods of the scientist--who is an expert practicing her or his profession--and those of a student who is
essentially a novice.”).

192

This criticism is directed at using practice scenarios to teach novices the underlying structure and knowledge
of the law. However, there are other sound pedagogical reasons for putting 1L students in practice
simulations. See, e.g., Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client as Subject: Humanizing the Legal Curriculum, 23
Clinical L. Rev. 37 (2016); David I.C. Thomson & Stephen Daniels, If You Build It, They Will Come: What
Students Say About Experiential Learning, 13 Fla. A&M L. Rev. 203, 223-27 (reporting survey responses
of 1Ls who wanted experiential learning as a cornerstone of their law school experiences); Drew Coursin,
Comment, Acting Like Lawyers, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1461; Rachel Croskery-Roberts, Ten Years In: A Critical
View of the Past, Present, and Future of Skills Education at UC Irvine Law School, 10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev.
469 (2020).

193

Kirschner, supra note 16, at 152.

194

One of the most common complaints of new associates is that their senior partners do not give them enough
feedback. Novices are starved for specific feedback on their work--not because they are emotionally
insecure, but because the practice of law is highly sophisticated from a cognitive viewpoint and quickly
reveals to new associates instability and gaps in their foundational knowledge.
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195

For an excellent discussion of the disconnect between first-year legal pedagogy and first-year assessments,
see Debora L. Threedy & Aaron Dewald, Re-Conceptualizing Doctrinal Teaching: Blending Online Videos
with In-Class Problem-Solving, 64 J. Legal Educ. 605 (2015). Unintentionally anticipating the academy's
move to online learning because of the Covid-19 pandemic, Professor Threedy advises assigning 10-minute
videos as homework to cover black-letter law, thereby freeing up class time to practice problem-solving.

196

Professor Shimamura call this “the sponge metaphor of education,” where the teacher pours out knowledge
and the students soak it up. Arthur Shimamura, MARGE: A Whole-Brain Learning Approach for Students
and Teachers 2 (2018).

197

See Willingham, supra note 2, at 72 (“The fear that students will end up with no more than rote knowledge
has been almost a phobia in the United States, but the truth is that rote knowledge is probably relatively
rare.”). However, Willingham goes on to note that “shallow knowledge” is much more common, i.e.,
“students have some understanding of the material but their understanding is limited.” Id. Willingham
describes shallow knowledge as being context-specific, i.e., students remember the material in the context
in which it was taught but are not able to apply the material to a novel context. Id. at 72-73.

198

Kahneman, supra note 1, at 117 (“The tendency to see patterns in randomness is overwhelming ....”).

199

Ho, supra note 15, at 131.

200

This statement reflects Bloom's Taxonomy, which illustrates and explains numerous concepts in learning.
Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, supra note 34, at 18.

201

See generally David Didau, Making Kids Cleverer: A Manifesto for Closing the Advantage Gap (Peter
Young ed., 2019); Wexler, supra note 90; E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Reading Comprehension Requires Knowledge-of Words and the World: Scientific Insights into the Fourth-Grade Slump and the Nation's Stagnant
Comprehension Scores, Am. Educator, Spring 2003, at 10.

202

See Kirschner & Hendrick, supra note 21, at 208-18 (discussing John Dunlosky, Katherine A. Rawson,
Elizabeth J. Marsh, Mitchell J. Nathan, & Daniel T. Willingham, Improving Students' Learning with
Effective Learning Techniques: Promising Directions from Cognitive and Educational Psychology, 14
Psych. Sci. Pub. Int. 4 (2013)); id. at 176-85 (discussing Principles of Instruction, supra note 22, at 12); The
Empirical Support for Direct Instruction, supra note 22, at 201-20.

203

Charles R. Splawn, Teaching Legal Analysis: A Tale from the Front, 27 Persps. 70, 71 (2019).

204

Id. at 71-72.

205

Id. at 72.

206

Id.

38
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3832901

EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION IN LEGAL EDUCATION: BOON OR..., 52 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1

207
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